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Abstract
The literature provides evidence on the separate roles of injunctive and descriptive
norms in explaining corporate financial reporting, ignoring that descriptive norms are
likely endogenous and partly explained by injunctive norms. We jointly analyze the
direct and indirect effects of religious social norms (an injunctive norm) via local crime
rates (a descriptive norm) on financial reporting quality. We find that religious social
norms relate negatively to corporate earnings management and tax avoidance. We also
show that this association is partially explainedby crime rates in thefirm’s geographical
environment, underlining the indirect relation between religious social norms and
financial reporting quality. Overall, the study highlights the importance of considering
the interrelations between injunctive and descriptive norms when analyzing the effect
of norms on corporate decision-making.
Keywords Injunctive norms · Religion · Descriptive norms · Crime · Earnings
management · Tax avoidance
JEL Classification D22 · M14 · M40
1 Introduction
Literature in accounting and finance suggests that managers consider injunctive and
descriptive norms in their decision-making, particularly whenmaking financial report-
ing decisions. McGuire et al. (2012b) find that firms manage earnings less the more
they are exposed to religious social norms (henceforth “religiousness”) at their head-
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characterized by high crime rates are more likely to manage earnings and avoid taxes.1
However, Evans et al. (1995) show that religiousness relates to crime rates; more gen-
erally, literature in psychology and economics suggests that descriptive norms are
endogenous and driven by injunctive norms (Schultz 1999; Fortin et al. 2007). Thus, it
is unclearwhether there is a direct relation between religious social norms andfinancial
reporting decisions, an indirect relation via criminality, or both. We contribute to this
line of research by examining the joint effects of injunctive and descriptive norms on
corporate financial reporting. In particular, we address the direct and indirect relations
between religiousness, crime, and financial reporting quality.
We first consider the effects of norms for individuals in the society. Following the
social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Hogg and Abrams 1988), individuals adhere to
norms prevailing in their social environment, as adopting the norms increases social
recognition and violating them entails the cost of social disregard (Hechter and Opp
2001; Stavrova et al. 2013). Religion encourages moral behavior, for example, by
the Ten Commandments in Christianity. Thus we expect a negative relation between
religiousness and individual criminality. Next, we consider the effects of norms for
managerial decision-making. Following the behavioral consistency theory (Allport
1937; Epstein 1979; Funder and Colvin 1991), employees consider norms in the firm’s
environment in their decision-making. Thus we expect a direct effect of religiousness
on corporate financial reporting. To the extent that managers consider descriptive
norms in their decision-making, we also expect an indirect effect of religiousness on
corporate financial reporting through crime.
To examine these predictions, we use data on religious adherence and crime
measured at theGermanmunicipality level, covering 32,973municipality-years obser-
vations. We measure religious adherence as the proportion of Christians, relative to
the total population in a municipality.2 We capture criminality as the natural logarithm
of the number of all types of crime per 100,000 inhabitants, measured at the district
level. To examine the prediction that religiousness directly and indirectly relates to
corporate financial reporting through crime, we combine data at the municipality and
district level with data at the firm level. We capture financial reporting quality via
financial reporting irregularities, such as earnings management and tax avoidance.3
The dataset covers the years 2011–2017, resulting in 1742 firm-year observations of
German publicly listed firms drawn from Thomson Reuters Datastream when using
earnings management as the measure of financial reporting irregularities and 782
1 Religion relates to financial reporting (e.g., McGuire et al. 2012b) as it works as an injunctive norm,
communicating moral approval or disapproval (Cialdini et al. 1990; Arruñada 2010; Küpper 2011). The
crime at headquarters’ location relates to financial reporting (Cho et al. 2020), as it works as a descriptive
norm referring to peers’ observable behavior (Cialdini et al. 1990).
2 The proportion of Christian adherents provides a reasonable measure of the strength of religiousness
in Germany. In 2015, only 8% of the total population in Germany represented non-Christian religious
adherents. The largest groups were Protestants (27%), Catholics (29%), and nondenominational citizens
(36%) (Source: https://fowid.de/meldung/religionszugehoerigkeiten-deutschland-2015).
3 We classify corporate financial reporting irregularities (e.g., earnings management) as managerial oppor-
tunism. This view is consistent with regulatory interventions intended to reduce earnings management (e.g.,
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act). We note that earnings management can be beneficial when managers communi-
cate private information through earnings management (e.g., Demski 1998; Arya et al. 2003).
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firm-year observations when using tax avoidance as the measure of financial reporting
irregularities.
We find strong support for a negative relation between religiousness and crime.
Moreover, we provide evidence on a direct positive relation between religiousness
and financial reporting quality. Finally, we find some support that crime serves as a
descriptive norm because crime relates to financial reporting quality, and we find an
indirect relation between religiousness and financial reporting quality through crime.
The results highlight the importance of considering injunctive and descriptive norms
as well as their interrelations when analyzing the effects of norms on firms’ decision-
making.
The study contributes to the accounting and finance literature that analyzes the role
of personal and social norms in explaining firm behavior.4 Consistent with the notion
that personal norms can explain managerial decision-making, Chyz (2013) finds that
managers with a higher propensity for personal tax aggressiveness are associated with
higher firm tax avoidance. Similarly, social norms driven by cultural characteristics,
such as religion, explain firm behavior as religiousness is associated with investment
decisions (e.g., Hilary and Hui 2009) and financial reporting quality (e.g., Dyreng
et al. 2012). Further, managers consider the behavior of corporate and individual
peers when making financial reporting decisions. Kedia et al. (2015) find that firms
are more likely to manage earnings when corporate peers (e.g., firms from the same
industry), by publicly announcing a restatement, indicate that they manage earnings.
Cho et al. (2020) show that firms are more likely to manage earnings and avoid taxes
the higher the crime rates at their headquarters’ locations.
We contribute to this literature by examining the joint effect of injunctive and
descriptive norms on corporate financial reporting. Since injunctive and descriptive
norms are conceptually and motivationally distinct, Cialdini et al. (1990) argue that
disentangling the norms’ effects on behavior is warranted, especially in situations
where these two types of norms operate simultaneously. We confirm sociological and
accountingfindings on the direct effect of injunctive norms (i.e., religious social norms)
on the behavior of individuals (i.e., crime) and managerial decisions (i.e., corporate
financial reporting irregularities). Consistent with the results of Cialdini et al. (1991)
and Kallgren et al. (2000), we find that the effect of injunctive norms captured by
religiousness on corporate financial reporting is stronger than the effect of descriptive
norms captured by crime. In particular, we find that religiousness is associated with
earnings management as well as tax avoidance while crime only relates to earnings
management. Cialdini et al. (1991) likewise argue that an individual’s perception
of what other individuals do in a particular setting (i.e., descriptive norms) is more
situation-specific than the perception of what other individuals approve or disapprove
of (i.e., injunctive norms). Thus injunctive norms stimulate norm-consistent behavior
across a wider range of settings and circumstances, in contrast with descriptive norms
(Kallgren et al. 2000).
Our results are interesting for investors, regulators, and the society at large. We
find that norms evolving through cultural characteristics and individuals’ behavior
4 Personal and social norms refer to a norm’s enforcement, where personal norms are self-based standards
associated with internalized values (e.g., Cialdini and Trost 1998) and social norms relate to a group’s
attitude of what ought to be done (e.g., Sunstein 1996).
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explain corporate financial reporting. In particular, we find that religiousness explains
criminality and fosters the creation of descriptive norms, affecting firm behavior. By
highlighting the continuing importance of religion in affecting individuals’ behavior,
despite the continuing decline in church membership, our finding contributes to the
societal debate on today’s role of religion.
2 Literature review and hypotheses development
2.1 Religious social norms and behavior
The first set of hypotheses addresses the relation between religion as an injunctive
norm, individual behavior, and firm behavior. In societies, norms typically constrain
the behavior of individuals (“statements that regulate behavior”, Horne 2001, p. 4),
thereby insuring the maintenance of values (Morris 1956) and prosocial or moral
behavior. Specifically, injunctive norms refer to rules or beliefs as to what constitutes
morally approved or disapproved behavior (Cialdini et al. 1990).
According to Arruñada (2010) and Küpper (2011), religion works as an injunctive
norm that influences behavior. For instance, Christian faith enforces moral behavior
via the Ten Commandments (Hechter and Opp 2001). In particular, one of the com-
mandments prohibits its adherents from stealing. When an individual conforms with
the injunctive norms formulated by Christian faith, the individual adjusts his or her
behavior. Consequently, the more individuals in a community conform to Christian
faith, the lower arguably are the theft rates in this community.
The social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Hogg and Abrams 1988) suggests a frame-
work to describe how an individual’s behavior is affected by injunctive norms.
According to this theory, the individual’s identity derives from the membership to
a social group, such as a religion, nationality, or occupation. The individual internal-
izes the group’s norms as adopting these norms increases social recognition, whereas
violating them is punished by social disregard or even an expulsion from the group
(e.g., Hechter and Opp 2001; Stavrova et al. 2013). For instance, Schultz (1999) finds
that feedback interventions intended to trigger norms influence recycling among com-
munity residents. Kallgren et al. (2000) provide experimental evidence that individuals
conform to an injunctive norm against littering. Fortin et al. (2007) underscore the role
of social interaction for individual tax evasion. Referring to religious social norms,
Cornwall (1989) finds that the likelihood of an individual following religious social
norms increases if this person has friends who do so.
Collectively, these arguments suggest that individuals are less likely to commit
crimes the more they are exposed to religious social norms, encouraging moral behav-
ior. The prediction is summarized in Hypothesis H1a, as follows.
H1a Religiousness relates negatively to crime.
Besides individuals’ behavior, religiousness also relates to firm behavior. Behav-
ioral consistency theory (Allport 1937; Epstein 1979; Funder and Colvin 1991)
suggests that an individual behaves consistently across situations. In particular, the
individual’s behavior is predictable based on the behavior in previous (similar) situa-
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tions.Work in accounting and finance provides evidence consistent with the behavioral
consistency theory. For instance, Chyz (2013) finds that managers with a high propen-
sity for personal tax aggressiveness are associated with high firm-level tax avoidance.
Hutton et al. (2014) suggest that managers who favor the Republican Party more
likely pursue conservative firm policies than managers who favor the Democratic
Party. Cronqvist et al. (2012) provide evidence on a positive relation between personal
and firm leverage.
Literature in accounting and finance identifies religious social norms as a driver
of firm behavior. For instance, religiousness is found to affect investment (Hilary and
Hui 2009), tax avoidance (Boone et al. 2012), corporate social responsibility (McGuire
et al. 2012a), corporate financial reporting (Dyreng et al. 2012; McGuire et al. 2012b),
ownership structure (Hofmann et al. 2020), audits (Leventis et al. 2018), and investors’
decision-making (Kumar et al. 2011; El Ghoul et al. 2012).
We follow Dyreng et al. (2012) and McGuire et al. (2012b) and study the relation
between religiousness and corporate financial reporting in Germany. For a firm located
in a religious area,Dyreng et al. (2012) find a lower likelihood of a financial restatement
and McGuire et al. (2012b) provide evidence that this firm is less likely to manage
accruals. Consistently,we expect that a firm’s exposure to religious social norms relates
positively to financial reporting quality (i.e., negatively to earnings management and
tax avoidance), as summarized in Hypothesis H1b, as follows.
H1b Religiousness relates positively to financial reporting quality.
2.2 Religious social norms, crime, and financial reporting
The second set of hypotheses addresses the relation between descriptive norms that
originate in crime and firm behavior. Besides culture driving (injunctive) norms, social
norms can also originate in peer behavior. We expect that individuals’ engagement in
crime relates to corporate financial reporting, suggesting that individuals’ inclination
to commit crime constitutes a descriptive norm. Considering Hypothesis H1a, we
then expect an indirect relation between religiousness and financial reporting through
crime. Consequently, we predict a joint effect of religiousness and crime on financial
reporting quality.
While injunctive norms inform individuals about what is commonly approved and
disapproved of, descriptive norms inform individuals about what is commonly done
(Cialdini et al. 1990; Kallgren et al. 2000). Although the existence and role of descrip-
tive norms is conceptually appealing, identifying the effects of descriptive norms
empirically is challenging because these norms carry information about individuals’
common behavior and are thus self-referential (see Küpper 2011, p. 75). For instance,
if a group of firms does not manage earnings, a researcher cannot conclude that this
common behavior is evidence for the existence of a descriptive norm to not manage
earnings. Our identification strategy is to identify the specific behavior of a group of
individuals and to show that this behavior enforces a distinct behavior of another group
of individuals.
The literature suggests that managers consider corporate peers’ behavior as well as
individual peers’ behavior when making financial reporting decisions, emphasizing
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the role of descriptive norms in guiding behavior. For instance, Kedia et al. (2015)
identify a descriptive norm at the firm level (i.e., peer firms’ financial reporting) by
showing that a firm’s likelihood of managing earnings increases if peer firms commit
misconduct. Cho et al. (2020) identifies a descriptive norm at the individual level (i.e.,
crime) by providing evidence that firms headquartered in areas characterized by high
crime rates are more likely to manage earnings and avoid taxes. Holzman et al. (2019)
provide further evidence on the interrelation between corporate and individual peers’
behavior by finding that neighborhood crime increases after visible accounting frauds
by firms.
Following Becker (1968), an individual’s decision to commit crime can be char-
acterized as the outcome of a cost–benefit analysis.5 Extending the individual’s
cost–benefit analysis with the normative role of crime, Kahan (1997) argues that an
individual’s criminality is reinforced by the criminality of the person’s peers. Specifi-
cally, when peers commit crimes, this suggests to the individual that themoral aversion
to crime (ex-ante psychic cost), the detection risk, and the reputational loss when being
arrested and convicted (ex-post psychic cost) are low. Consequently, when crime is
widespread, the individual is more likely to commit crime, reinforcing a descriptive
norm to engage in crime or restricting a descriptive norm to not do so.
While crime can constitute a variety of conduct, including theft, fraud, or property
damage, financial reporting decisions often relate to perfectly legal earnings manage-
ment or tax avoidance. However, as the detection risk and the psychic costs involved
with moral aversion and reputational loss are also relevant for the trade-off associated
with financial reporting decisions, widespread crime can serve as a descriptive norm
that affects managers’ decisions regarding financial reporting quality.
Combining the prior arguments, we expect managers to consider descriptive norms
that originate in crime in the firms’ environment when making financial reporting
decisions. The prediction is summarized in Hypothesis H2, as follows.
H2 Crime relates negatively to financial reporting quality.
Finding evidence for a direct effect of religiousness on crime (Hypothesis H1a)
as well as a direct effect of crime on financial reporting quality (Hypothesis H2)
suggests that there may be an indirect relation between religiousness and financial
reporting quality through crime, in addition to a direct effect of religiousness on finan-
cial reporting quality (Hypothesis H1b). We summarize our prediction in Hypothesis
3, as follows.
H3 Religiousness relates indirectly to financial reporting quality through crime.
Summarizing the prior discussion, Fig. 1 presents our conceptual framework.
5 Additionally, the individual may have a self-imposed moral constraint constituting the upper limit of
criminality.
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Fig. 1 Conceptual framework
3 Research design
3.1 Samples
We are generally interested in the role of norms in explaining firm behavior. For the
analysis on the relation between religiousness and crime (Hypothesis H1a), we match
municipality-level data on religious adherence of Germans from the German Federal
Statistical Office with crime rate information at the district level from the Federal
Criminal Police Office (Sample 1). The resulting dataset ranges from 2014 to 2017
and covers 32,973 municipality-years observations.
For the analysis on the relation between norms and corporate financial reporting
(Hypotheses H1b, H2, and H3), we match the datasets on religious adherence at the
municipality level and crime rates at the district level with firm data (Sample 2). The
matched dataset includes data from 2011 to 2017 and covers 1742 firm-year observa-
tions of German publicly listed firms drawn from Thomson Reuters Datastream when
using earningsmanagement as ameasure of corporate financial reporting irregularities
and 782 firm-year observations when using tax avoidance as a measure of corporate
financial reporting irregularities. The sample selection process is described in Table
1. Panel A reports on the sample selection process for the analysis on the relation
between religiousness and crime. Panel B reports on the sample selection process for
the analysis on the relation between norms and corporate financial reporting.
Table 9 in “Appendix” provides information on the geographical representativeness
of both samples. For each sample, we list the number of observations per German
state.6 To evaluate the representativeness of the samples, we benchmark these statistics
to state characteristics. To assess the representativeness of the sample on the analysis
between religiousness and crime (Sample 1), we benchmark the number of sample
observations per state to the German states’ area in square kilometers. Likewise, to
assess the representativeness of the sample on the analysis between norms and earnings
management (Sample 2), we benchmark the number of sample observations per state
to the GDP per German state.
Regarding Sample 1, most of the municipality-year observations are located in
Bavaria (24.79%), Baden-Württemberg (13.29%), andRhineland Palatinate (13.28%).
6 A state is comprised of several districts and is the coarsest administrative classification in Germany.
Germany is divided into 16 states.
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Table 1 Sample on (a) religiousness and crime and (b) norms and financial reporting quality
Sample selection # observations
(a)
Data on religious adherence 49,645
Drop observations with missing data on crime rates 49,600
Drop observations with missings in demographic controls 32,973
Final sample 32,973
(b)
Potential dataset datastreama 7344
Drop observations with missing identifier or location information or headquarter not
in Germany
5168
Drop observations with missing legal form or legal form of private limited company
or partnership
5120
Drop observations with missing religion information 5080
Drop observations with missing crime data 4444
Drop observations with missing data on tax enforcement effectiveness 4381
Drop observations with missings in demographic controls 4340
Drop observations with missings in earnings management controls data 1742
Final sample earnings management analysis 1742
Drop observations with missings in tax avoidance controls data 782
Final sample tax avoidance analysis 782
(a) Reports the sample selection process and presents the final sample of the analysis of religiousness and
crime. The sample includes the years 2014–2017
(b) Reports the sample selection process and presents the final sample of the analysis on norms and firm
behavior. The sample includes the years 2011–2017.Note thatwehave two samples to analyze tax avoidance.
We hereby report on the sample selection process of the first sample. The second sample to analyze tax
avoidance contains 1781 firm-year observations
aAll German domestic publicly listed firms in Thomson Financial Datastream from 2010 to 2017
Since Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg are the largest and third largest German states,
respectively, in terms of the area in square kilometers, the sample seems to be represen-
tative. Regarding Sample 2, most of the firm-year observations are located in Bavaria
(21.41%), North Rhine-Westphalia (21.41%), and Baden-Württemberg (15.90%).
Since these three states also contributed more than 50% of the GDP in 2017, the
sample seems to be representative.
Table 10 in “Appendix” shows that most of the sample firms are from the manufac-
turing industry (42.25%), followed by the information and communication industry
(19.46%).
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3.2 Variable measurement and data sources
3.2.1 Norms
As Christianity represents by far the most prevalent religion in Germany, we mea-
sure the strength of religious social norms (i.e., religiousness) as the proportion of
Christian adherents. We obtain data on religious adherence for 2007–2010 from the
German Federal Statistical Office.7 This dataset contains information on the number
of Christian adherents at the German municipality level,8 that is, the religious adher-
ence for all German citizens delivering an income tax statement to tax authorities.
The variable of interest is the religiousness in a municipality measured as the number
of Christian adherents divided by the number of taxpayers in a municipality (RELI-
GION).We argue that individuals follow religious social norms in their environment to
be accepted socially (e.g., Hechter and Opp 2001; Stavrova et al. 2013). Along these
lines, Cornwall (1989) finds that an individual more likely follows religious social
norms if that person has religious friends.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the geographical distribution of RELIGION for the
year 2010, where a darker color indicates a higher proportion of Christian adherents.
In the analysis of firm behavior, we follow Hilary and Hui (2009), Dyreng et al.
(2012), and McGuire et al. (2012b) and use the proportion of Christian adherents
at corporate headquarters’ location as a proxy for the strength of religious social
norms that the firm’s employees (including managers) are exposed to. We consider
the location of corporate headquarters, because headquarters represents the focal point
of information exchangewhere core business activities are usually conducted (Pirinsky
and Qinghai 2006; Davis and Henderson 2008). We linearly inter- and extrapolate the
dataset on religious adherence to get a full dataset for the years 2010–2017.9
To test for the existence of a descriptive norm, we analyze the relation between
individuals’ commission of crimes at headquarters’ location and corporate financial
reporting irregularities. The variable CRIME captures the natural logarithm of the
number of all types of crime per 100,000 inhabitants and is measured at the district
level.10 We obtain this dataset for the years 2011–2017 from the police crime statistics
provided by the Federal Criminal Police Office. Figure 3 graphically illustrates the
geographical distribution of CRIME for the year 2017; darker color indicates more
crime.
7 Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Lohn- und Einkom-
mensteuerstatistik, 1995–2010, own calculations. Data received September 3rd, 2015.
8 A municipality is the smallest administrative district in Germany. In particular, as of 2017, Germany was
divided into 13,361 municipalities (Source: German Federal Statistical Office).
9 By linearly inter- and extrapolating the religious adherence data, we assume a linear trend in religious
adherence. We interpolate the data on religious adherence from 2007 and 2010 to get information on
religious adherence for the years 2008 and 2009, and we use the linear trend to predict religious adherence
for the years 2011–2017.
10 A district comprises several municipalities and is the second smallest geographical administrative unit
in Germany. In 2017, Germany was divided into 476 districts (Source: German Federal Statistical Office).
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Fig. 2 Geographical distribution ofChristian faith adherence in 2010 at theGerman district level. It illustrates
the geographic distribution of Christian faith in Germany for the year 2010 at the district level. Districts
(states) are marked with grey lines (bold black lines). A district comprises several municipalities and is the
second smallest geographical administrative unit in Germany. Darker color indicates a higher proportion
of Christian adherents within a district. The figure is created using the dataset from the German Federal
Statistical Office (Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder,
Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik, 1995–2010, own calculations) and the German Federal Agency for
Cartography and Geodesy’s (“Bundesamt für Kartographie und Geodäsie”) administrative regions data
from 2013, and is compiled with the help of ArcMap by ESRI
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Fig. 3 Geographical distribution of crime in 2017 at the German district level. It illustrates the geographic
distribution of crime inGermany for the year 2017 at the district level. Districts (states) aremarkedwith grey
lines (bold black lines). A district comprises several municipalities and is the second smallest geographical
administrative unit in Germany. Darker color indicatesmore crimes per 100,000 inhabitants within a district.
The figure is created using data from police crime statistics provided by the Federal Criminal Police
Office and the German Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy’s (“Bundesamt für Kartographie und
Geodäsie”) administrative regions data from 2017, and is compiled with the help of ArcMap by ESRI
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3.2.2 Financial reporting quality
We focus on two types of corporate financial reporting irregularities: earnings man-
agement and tax avoidance. We use three measures for a firm’s earnings management
and two measures for its tax avoidance.
Regarding earnings management, we use one measure related to accrual-based
earnings management and twomeasures related to real earnings management. First, to
capture accrual-based earningsmanagement, |ABEM | is the absolute value of abnormal
accruals estimated using a cross-sectional performance-adjusted Jones model (see
Kothari et al. 2005).
Second, following Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), and McGuire et al.
(2012b), REM1 is a measure of real earnings management calculated as the sum
of abnormal discretionary expenditures (AB_DISC) and abnormal production cost








where DISC_EXP is the sum of R&D expenses and SG&A expenses (which include
advertising expenses in Thomson Reuters Datastream), Sales is defined as annual
revenues, and Assets as total assets. We set R&D expenses equal to 0 if they are
missing but SG&A expenses are available, and we multiply AB_DISC by − 1, such
that higher values of AB_DISC indicate an increase in real earnings management.












where PROD is the sum of cost of goods sold and change in inventory from one year
to the next. We standardize AB_PROD by multiplying it with − 1.
Third, followingMcGuire et al. (2012b), REM2 is another measure of real earnings
management calculated as the sumof abnormal discretionary expenditures (AB_DISC)











where CFO is defined as cash flows from operations. We standardize AB_CASH by
multiplying it with − 1.
Regarding tax avoidance practices, we followRego andWilson (2012) and consider
predicted tax benefits. Specifically, PRED_UTB is estimated as follows:
PRED_UT B = −0.004 + 0.011 × ROA + 0.001 × SI Z E + 0.010 × FOR_SALE
+ 0.092 × RD − 0.002 × DI SC_ACCR + 0.003 × LEV + 0.000 × MB
+ 0.014 × SGA − 0.018 × SALES_GR,
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where ROA is the return on assets divided by lagged total assets; SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets; FOR_SALE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm
reports foreign sales, 0 otherwise;RD is research and development expenses divided by
lagged total assets;DISC_ACCR is the absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated,
using a cross-sectional performance-adjusted Jones model (see Kothari et al. 2005);
LEV is the financial leverage divided by lagged total assets;MB is the market-to-book
ratio; SGA is selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by lagged total
assets; and SALES_GR is the growth in sales.














An increase in either PRED_UTB or BTD signals greater tax avoidance. We obtain
data for the measures of earnings management and tax avoidance from Thomson
Reuters Datastream.
3.2.3 Controls
In the regression analyses, we control for the strength of enforcement. Kahan (1997)
argues that the law-enforcement policy affects a community’s criminality. Specifi-
cally, the cost of crime increases in the clearance and sanctioning of crime by third
parties, like judges or the police. We follow Evans et al. (1995) and proxy for enforce-
ment at the individual level by sanction severity. The variable SANCTION_SEVERITY
captures the relative sanction severity, defined as the average deviation in the num-
ber of years of freedom sanction per German state and year from the yearly mean
over all states in Germany (see Grundies 2016).11 Thus, SANCTION_SEVERITY cap-
tures regional differences in sanction severity across Germany. To proxy for regional
sanction differences, we obtain data from the German Federal Statistical Office.12
Following Evans et al. (1995), we include the previous year’s clearance rate as
a control variable, because it signals to individuals the likelihood of crimes being
detected, thereby affecting the likelihood of their commission. CLEARANCE_RATE
is measured as the proportion of cleared crimes per district. We obtain information on
clearance rates for the years 2011–2017 from the statistics provided by the Federal
Criminal Police Office. Figure 4 graphically illustrates the geographical distribution
of the number of crimes cleared for the year 2017; darker color indicates a higher
clearance rate.
We proxy for enforcement at the firm level by the tax authorities’ effectiveness. The
variable TAX_AUTHORITY captures the number of employees at each tax authority
11 The dataset on sanction severity contains anonymized information on each crime per year and state,
including the type of crime and the type of sanction (i.e., money or imprisonment). To construct the variable
SANCTION_SEVERITY , we aggregate the data first for each type of crime and then for each state-year.
12 Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Strafverfol-
gungsstatistik, 2014–2017, own calculations.
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Fig. 4 Geographical distribution of the clearance rate in 2017 at the German district level. It illustrates the
geographic distribution of the clearance rate in Germany for the year 2017 at the district level. Districts
(states) are marked with grey lines (bold black lines). A district comprises several municipalities and is
the second smallest geographical administrative unit in Germany. Darker color indicates a higher clearance
rate in percent within a district. The figure is created using data from police crime statistics provided
by the Federal Criminal Police Office and the German Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy’s
(“Bundesamt für Kartographie und Geodäsie”) administrative regions data from 2017, and is compiled
with the help of ArcMap by ESRI
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site per 10,000 assigned inhabitants. TAX_AUTHORITY proxies for the time a tax
authority’s employee can spend per inhabitant. Since listed firms are usually located
in cities, which are more populous than rural areas, TAX_AUTHORITY also captures
the time a tax authority’s employee can spend auditing firms. We obtain information
on the number of employees per tax-authority site in full-time equivalents from the
state tax authorities for the year 2014.
We include several demographic variables in the regression models. Demographic
characteristics may be correlated with religious adherence, individuals’ criminality, or
both. In particular, we include age, gender, nationality, education, income, and marital
status as control variables, as these variables may be correlated with religious adher-
ence (see Iannaccone 1998 and Hilary and Hui 2009). AGE is measured as the natural
logarithm of the average age of inhabitants per district. GENDER is the proportion of
female inhabitants per district. NATIONALITY is the proportion of inhabitants with
foreign (i.e., non-German) nationality per district. EDUCATION is the proportion of
inhabitants having a general or subject-linked higher education entrance qualification
per district. INCOME is the natural logarithm of the available income per inhabitant
per district.MARRIED is the proportion of married inhabitants per district.13
Additionally, we control for unemployment and urbanity, as these variables may be
correlated with individuals’ criminality.We expect more crimes the higher the number
of unemployed inhabitants and the more urban the area of investigation. UNEM-
PLOYED is the share of unemployed inhabitants on total population per municipality.
URBANITY is the natural logarithm of the number of inhabitants per square kilometer
at the district level.14 We obtain data on demographic characteristics from theGerman
Federal Statistical Office and the German Federal Labor Office.
In the analysis on the relation between norms and earnings management, we follow
McGuire et al. (2012b) and add the following firm-specific control variables that are
found to relate to corporate financial reporting irregularities (e.g., Jones et al. 2008):
SIZE, ROA, LEV , BIG4, BM, LOSS, BENCHMARK , OP_RISK , INVEST , and NOA.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity. ROA is the return on assets and
captures firm profitability. LEV is the financial leverage defined as total debt to total
capital. BIG4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a Big Four
auditor, 0 otherwise. BM is the book-to-market ratio capturing growth opportunities.
We include the variables LOSS and BENCHMARK as control variables to proxy for
the firms’ need tomanage earnings (Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010;McGuire et al.
2012b). LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if income before extraordinary items
is negative in the current or previous two fiscal years, 0 otherwise. BENCHMARK is
an indicator variable equal to 1 if either the net income divided by total assets or the
change in net income divided by total assets from year t− 1 to year t are nonnegative
and less than 0.01, 0 otherwise.
OP_RISK captures the firm’s operating risk, defined as the natural logarithm of the
5-year rolling standard deviation of cash flows from operations computed from the
current and prior four fiscal years. We include the firm’s operating risk as a control
13 As we only have data on marital status and education for the years 2011 and 2014, respectively, we
assume these variables to be constant throughout the sample period.
14 We do not have data on the size of districts in square kilometers in 2017. Thus we assume it to be equal
to the values in 2016.
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variable, becauseHilary andHui (2009) find a negative effect of religious adherence on
the riskiness of investment decisions. INVEST captures the investment rate in tangible
capital, defined as the ratio of capital expenditures in year t to net property, plant, and
equipment at the end of year t− 1.We control for the investment rate in tangible capital
because Hilary and Hui (2009) find that firms located in religious areas invest less.
NOA captures the net operating assets, defined as the sum of shareholders’ equity plus
total debt at the beginning of the year, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year.
We control for net operating assets to capture the firms’ abilities tomanage earnings by
manipulating accruals. Finally,URBANITY is potentially related to corporate financial
reporting irregularities. For instance,Urcan (2007) provides evidence that firms located
in rural areas display higher earnings quality.
In the analysis on the relation between norms and tax avoidance, we follow Boone
et al. (2012) and add the following firm-specific control variables that are found to
relate to tax avoidance (Chen et al. 2010): ROA, NOL, SIZE2, LEV , PPE, INTANG,
and MB. ROA and NOL proxy for the firm’s need to avoid income taxes (Boone
et al. 2012). NOL is a net operating loss indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm did
report an operating income smaller 0, 0 otherwise. We additionally control for firm
size (SIZE2), leverage (LEV ), and capital intensity (PPE and INTANG), capturing
economies of scale and firm complexity that may relate to tax avoidance. SIZE2 is
the market capitalization, calculated as the natural logarithm of the beginning of year
common shares outstanding times beginning of year stock price. PPE is net property,
plant, and equipment divided by lagged total assets. INTANG is intangible assets
divided by lagged total assets. Finally, we add the control variable MB defined as the
market-to-book ratio capturing firm growth (Chen et al. 2010).15 For an overview on
all variables see Table 11 in “Appendix”.
We match firm data from Thomson Reuters Datastream with data on religious
adherence from the German Federal Statistical Office, using postal codes and the
official municipality keys of firm locations from Geodaten-Deutschland.de,16 which
translates postal codes into official municipality keys.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics on the dependent, independent, and control
variables. RELIGION has a mean (median) value of 0.56 (0.62), suggesting that more
than half of the inhabitants per municipality adhere to Christianity. The statistics of
the variable CRIME suggest that on average 7700 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants
are recorded per district and year. The clearance rate (CLEARANCE_RATE) ranges
between 41 and 97% (untabulated), with a mean and median value of 62%. The statis-
tics for SANCTION_SEVERITY suggest that there are high regional differences in
sanction practices between the German states. In particular, the relative sanction sever-
ity in years with freedom sanction per state and year ranges between − 90 and 186%
(untabulated). The corporate enforcement variable, TAX_AUTHORITY , indicates that
15 Due to missing data, we do not control for the change in net operating loss carry forwards, income from
foreign operations, and CEO risk incentives (see Boone et al. 2012; Rego and Wilson 2012).
16 https://www.geodaten-deutschland.de/index.php.
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tax authorities employ on average 15 employees per 10,000 assigned inhabitants with
a standard deviation of 4.
Table 2 also lists the descriptive statistics on firm characteristics. In the earnings-
management-analysis sample, containing 1742 firm-year observations, firms have on
average a return on assets of 3% and a financial leverage of 34%. Moreover, 54% of
sample firms are audited by a Big Four auditor. On average, 39% of firms experience
a loss in the current or previous two fiscal years in the sample period.
Finally, Table 2 reports on the demographic characteristics. Inhabitants in the
sample consisting of 32,973 municipality-year observations have an average age of
44 years (AGE). Women and men represent roughly half of the municipalities’ inhab-
itants (GENDER). Forty-eight percent of the inhabitants are married (MARRIED).
Tables 3, 4 and 5 provide the results of a Pearson correlation analysis. Table
3 reports the correlations on the analysis of norms and crime using 32,973
municipality-year observations. Consistent with expectations, we find a negative
relation between religiousness and crime. RELIGION is negatively and statistically
significantly (p-value<0.01) correlated with CRIME. SANCTION_SEVERITY and
CLEARANCE_RATE are negatively and statistically significantly (p-value<0.01)
related to CRIME. Consistent with Hilary and Hui (2009) and McGuire et al. (2012b),
RELIGION is strongly and negatively associated with AGE (− 0.65, p-value<0.01)
and UNEMPLOYED (− 0.63, p-value<0.01). The Pearson correlation coefficients
between the variables of interest and the demographic characteristics range between
− 0.65 and 0.62, dispelling the concern of multicollinearity.
Table 4 reports the correlations on the analysis of norms and earnings management
using 1742 firm-year observations. RELIGION relates negatively to the measure of
accrual-based earnings management (|ABEM|) as well as one measure for real earn-
ings management (REM1). The relation is statistically significant (one-sided p-value
<0.10) for |ABEM|. These findings are consistent with the expectation of a posi-
tive relation between religiousness and financial reporting quality. We find a positive
and statistically significant relation (one-sided p-value <0.01) between CRIME and
|ABEM|. This finding is consistent with the expectation that crime relates negatively
to financial reporting quality.
In contrast to expectations, the relation between RELIGION and the second real
earnings management measure (REM2) is positive and statistically significant (one-
sided p-value<0.05), and the relation between CRIME and REM2 is negative and
statistically significant (one-sided p-value<0.01). Note that the Pearson correlation
analysis only considers bivariate statistics and ignores potential interrelations between
RELIGION and CRIME. Thus we postpone a more detailed interpretation of the rela-
tions to the regression analyses in Sect. 4.17
Table 5 reports the correlations on the analysis of norms and tax avoidance using
782 firm-year observations. We find a negative but insignificant association between
17 Themeasure of accrual-based earningsmanagement (|ABEM|) is negatively and statistically significantly
(p-value<0.05) related to onemeasure for real earningsmanagement (REM2), suggesting that accrual-based
earnings management and real earnings management are substitutes. This finding is consistent with Graham
et al. (2005), suggesting that managers trade off accrual-based earnings management and real earnings
management in opportunistically altering reported earnings. The positive relation between religiousness
and real earnings management (REM2) is consistent with McGuire et al. (2012b).
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean q25 q50 q75 Std. dev
Norms
RELIGION 32,973 0.56 0.47 0.62 0.73 0.22
CRIME 32,973 8.95 8.43 8.90 9.44 0.65
Individual and corporate enforcement
SANCTION_SEVERITY 32,973 0.41 − 0.48 − 0.02 1.50 0.91
CLEARANCE_RATE 32,973 0.62 0.57 0.62 0.66 0.08
TAX_AUTHORITY 1742 15.34 11.45 15.86 17.90 4.36
Earnings management
|ABEM| 1742 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.28
REM1 1742 0.14 0.05 0.18 0.31 0.33
REM2 1742 0.03 − 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.41
SIZE 1742 5.23 3.50 5.07 6.79 2.24
ROA 1742 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.12
LEV 1742 0.34 0.10 0.31 0.51 0.29
BIG4 1742 0.54 0 1 1 0.50
BM 1742 0.79 0.36 0.63 1.01 0.72
LOSS 1742 0.39 0 0 1 0.49
OP_RISK 1742 9.34 8.04 9.06 10.55 1.85
URBANITY 1742 7.14 6.22 7.60 7.94 1.11
BENCHMARK 1742 0.23 0 0 0 0.42
INVEST 1742 0.45 0.09 0.19 0.38 1.07
NOA 1742 0.70 0.56 0.71 0.84 0.24
Tax avoidance
PRED_UTB 782 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
BTD 1781 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
ROA 782 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.13
LEV 782 0.28 0.09 0.26 0.44 0.22
NOL 782 0.20 0 0 0 0.40
PPE 782 0.22 0.08 0.20 0.32 0.17
INTANG 782 0.21 0.05 0.14 0.32 0.19
SIZE2 782 13.06 11.67 13.14 15.01 2.69
MB 782 2.32 1.12 1.76 2.82 1.95
Demographic characteristics
AGE 32,973 3.79 3.77 3.79 3.81 0.04
GENDER 32,973 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.01
NATIONALITY 32,973 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.04
EDUCATION 32,973 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.30 0.07
INCOME 32,973 9.96 9.89 9.98 10.04 0.10
UNEMPLOYED 32,973 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01
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Table 2 continued
Variable Obs Mean q25 q50 q75 Std. dev
MARRIED 32,973 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.01
URBANITY 32,973 5.00 4.60 4.88 5.30 0.60
This table presents descriptive statistics on the independent, dependent, and control variables
RELIGION is the proportion of Christian adherents per municipality; CRIME is the natural logarithm of
the number of all crimes per 100,000 inhabitants per district; SANCTION_SEVERITY captures the relative
sanction severity in the number of years with freedom sanction per state; CLEARANCE_RATE is the pro-
portion of cleared crimes per district; TAX_AUTHORITY is the number of employees in the tax authority
per 10,000 assigned inhabitants; |ABEM| is the absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated using a
cross-sectional performance-adjusted Jones model (see Kothari et al. 2005); REM1 is an aggregate measure
of real earnings management calculated as the sum of abnormal discretionary expenditures and abnormal
production costs; REM2 is an aggregate measure of real earnings management calculated as the sum of
abnormal discretionary expenditures and abnormal cash flows; SIZE is the natural logarithm ofmarket value
of equity; ROA is the return on assets; LEV is the financial leverage defined as total debt to total capital;
BIG4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a BIG4 auditor, 0 otherwise; BM is the book-
to-market ratio; LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if income before extraordinary items was negative
in the current or previous two fiscal years, 0 otherwise; OP_RISK captures the firm operating risk, defined
as the natural logarithm of the five-year rolling standard deviation of cash flows from operations computed
from the current and prior four fiscal years;URBANITY is the natural logarithm of the number of inhabitants
per square kilometer at the district level; BENCHMARK is an indicator variable equal to 1 if (a) net income
divided by total assets is greater than or equal to 0 and less than 0.01 or (b) the change in net income divided
by total assets from year t − 1 to year t is greater than or equal to 0 and less than 0.01, 0 otherwise; INVEST
captures the investment rate in tangible capital defined as the ratio of capital expenditures in year t to net
property, plant, and equipment at the end of year t − 1; NOA captures the net operating assets, which is
defined as the sum of shareholders’ equity plus total debt at the beginning of the year, scaled by total assets
at the beginning of the year; PRED_UTB captures predicted tax benefits (see Rego and Wilson 2012); BTD
captures book-tax-differences (see Wilson 2009); NOL is a net operating loss indicator variable equal to
1 if the firm did report an operating income smaller 0, 0 otherwise; PPE captures net property, plant and
equipment divided by lagged total assets; INTANG captures intangible assets divided by lagged total assets;
SIZE2 captures the market capitalization calculated as the natural logarithm of beginning of year common
shares outstanding times beginning of year stock price;MB is the market-to-book ratio; AGE is the natural
logarithm of the average age of inhabitants per district;GENDER is the proportion of female inhabitants per
district; NATIONALITY is the proportion of inhabitants with foreign nationality per district; EDUCATION
is the proportion of inhabitants having a general or subject-linked higher education entrance qualification
per district; INCOME is the natural logarithm of the available income per inhabitant per district; UNEM-
PLOYED is the share of unemployed inhabitants on total population per municipality; MARRIED is the
proportion of married inhabitants per district. The variables RELIGION and CLEARANCE_RATE and the
demographic characteristics variables are lagged by 1 year. All continuous firm characteristics variables are
winsorized at 99% in the analyses. For an overview on the variables see Table 11 in "Appendix"
RELIGION and the measures of tax avoidance (i.e., PRED_UTB and BTD). The rela-
tion between CRIME and the measures of tax avoidance is insignificant. Again, note
that the Pearson correlation analysis only considers bivariate statistics and ignores
potential interrelations between RELIGION andCRIME; we postpone amore detailed
interpretation of the relations to the regression analyses.
4 Regressionmodels and results
We conduct two sets of empirical analyses: first, relying on a sample of 32,973
municipality-year observations, we analyze the relation between religiousness and
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crime (H1a). Second, relying on a sample of 1742 (782) firm-year observations, we
analyze the relation between religiousness and financial reporting quality (H1b) and
the existence of a descriptive norm originated in crime (H2 and H3).
4.1 Religious social norms and crime
To analyze the relation between the exposure to religious social norms (captured by
the proportion of Christian adherents) and criminality (captured by the number of
crimes), we run the following regression model:
CRIME j,t = γ × REL IGI ONi,t−1 + X i, j,k,t−1β + μt + ε j,t , (1)
where CRIME j,t is the level of criminal activity per 100,000 inhabitants per
district j and year t; REL IGI ONi,t−1 is the proportion of Christians per munic-
ipality i and year t− 1; X i, j,k,t−1 is a vector of the control variables, including
SANCTION_SEVERITY , CLEARANCE_RATE, AGE, GENDER, NATIONALITY ,
EDUCATION , INCOME, UNEMPLOYED, MARRIED, and URBANITY measured
at the municipality i or district j or state k level per year t− 1; μt captures year fixed
effects. To address reverse causality concerns, we lag the independent and control
variables by one year (except for SANCTION_SEVERITY due to data constraints). All
variables are described in Sect. 3.2. We expect γ in regression (1) to be negative.
We estimate the models by OLS using 32,973municipality-year observations in the
period of 2014–2017. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level to
consider that the strength of Christian norms at the headquarters location is quasi-fixed
(Angrist and Pischke 2008).18 We present the results from the regression analysis in
Table 6.
Models (1a) and (1b) report the results on the relation between RELIGION and
CRIME. Model (1a) is estimated without control variables, while model (1b) is esti-
mated with control variables. Consistent with expectations, we find a negative and
statistically significant (p-value<0.01) relation between RELIGION and CRIME in
both models. The coefficients on SANCTION_SEVERITY and CLEARANCE_RATE
are negative and statistically significant (p-value<0.01). Statistics at the end of Table
6 confirm the statistically significant effect of the variables of interest.
The results on the demographic controls are largely consistent with expectations.
For instance, we find a negative and statistically significant (p-value<0.01) association
between income and crime. Moreover, we find a positive and statistically significant
(p-value<0.01) association between unemployment and crime. Finally, more urban
regions are characterized by more crime (p-value<0.01).
Overall, the results presented in Table 6 confirm Hypothesis H1a. In particular, we
find that religiousness is statistically significantly negatively related to crime.
18 As religious adherence is relatively constant in our sample period, we cannot run a firm fixed effects
regression.
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Table 6 Religiousness and crime
Variables (1a) (1b)
CRIME CRIME
RELIGION − 0.77*** (0.026) − 0.53*** (0.036)
SANCTION_SEVERITY − 20.85*** (0.626) − 12.84*** (0.501)
CLEARANCE_RATE − 2.45*** (0.113) − 1.41*** (0.101)




INCOME − 1.07*** (0.079)
UNEMPLOYED 3.07*** (0.403)
MARRIED − 8.49*** (0.566)
URBANITY 0.50*** (0.016)
Constant 10.89*** (0.063) 19.80*** (1.273)
Year fixed effects Yes
Number of observations 32,973 32,973
F-statistic 1198.92*** 1265.74***
Adjusted R-squared 0.309 0.573
This table reports the results on the effect of religiousness on crime. All models are estimated by OLS.
Model (1a) is estimated without controls. Model (1b) is estimated with controls. Standard errors clustered
at the municipality level are reported in parentheses
CRIME is the natural logarithm of the number of all crimes per 100,000 inhabitants per district; RELIGION
is the proportion ofChristian adherents permunicipality; SANCTION_SEVERITY captures the relative sanc-
tion severity in the number of years with freedom sanction per state; CLEARANCE_RATE is the proportion
of cleared crimes per district; AGE is the natural logarithm of the average age of inhabitants per district;
GENDER is the proportion of female inhabitants per district; NATIONALITY is the proportion of inhabi-
tants with foreign nationality per district; EDUCATION is the proportion of inhabitants having a general or
subject-linked higher education entrance qualification per district; INCOME is the natural logarithm of the
available income per inhabitant per district;UNEMPLOYED is the share of unemployed inhabitants on total
population per municipality;MARRIED is the proportion of married inhabitants per district; URBANITY is
the natural logarithm of the number of inhabitants per square kilometer at the district level. All independent
and control variables are lagged by 1 year except for the variable SANCTION_SEVERITY . Furthermore,
we control for year fixed effects. For an overview on the variables see Table 11 in “Appendix”
*,**,*** Two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
4.2 Norms and financial reporting quality
4.2.1 Norms and earnings management
To analyze the effect of religiousness and crime on managers’ engagement in earnings
management, we run the following mediation regression model, in which RELIGION
123
Religion, crime, and financial reporting 903
is defined as the treatment variable, CRIME as the mediator variable, and EM as the
outcome variable19:
CRIME j,t = γ × REL IGI ONi,t + X l,i, j,tβ + μm + ε j,t , (2)
EMl,t = γ × REL IGI ONi,t + δ × CRIME j,t + X l,i, j,tβ + μm + εl,t , (3)
where CRIME j,t is the level of criminal activity per 100,000 inhabitants per district
j and year t; REL IGI ONi,t is the proportion of Christians per municipality i and
year t; EMl,t is a vector of the measures of earnings management, including |ABEM|,
REM1, and REM2 per firm l and year t; X l,i, j,t is a vector of the firm-specific and
demographic control variables, including the firm-specific variables SIZE, ROA, LEV ,
BIG4, BM, LOSS, OP_RISK , BENCHMARK , INVEST , and NOA per firm l and year
t; TAX_AUTHORITY captures the effectiveness of tax authorities per municipality
i; and the demographic variables are URBANITY , INCOME, EDUCATION , AGE,
NATIONALITY , and a measure of the population size per district j and year t; μm is
an industry control variable. All variables are described in Sect. 3.2. We expect γ to
be negative in regressions (2) and (3), and δ to be positive in regression (3).
Table 7 presents the results on the analysis of norms and earnings management.
Model (1) presents the estimation of the regression Eq. (2), which addresses the direct
effect of religiousness on crime. Models (2) to (4) present the estimation of regression
Eq. (3), which addresses the direct effect of religiousness on earnings management as
well as the indirect effect of religiousness on earnings management through crime.We
estimate the models using 1742 firm-year observations in the period of 2011–2017.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. All models are estimated by
OLS.
In line with the results in Sect. 4.1, we find a negative and statistically signifi-
cant (one-sided p-value<0.01) relation between RELIGION and CRIME [see model
(1)]. Consistent with Hypothesis H1b, we find a negative and statistically significant
(one-sided p-value<0.10) relation between RELIGION and REM1, suggesting that
religiousness is negatively associated with real earnings management. We also find a
negative relation when using REM2 as a measure of real earnings management, but
the relation is insignificant.
Consistent with Hypothesis H2, we find a positive and statistically significant
(one-sided p-value<0.05) relation between CRIME and accrual-based earnings man-
agement (|ABEM|), suggesting that crime is negatively associated with financial
reporting quality and thus works as a descriptive norm.
In contrast to expectations, we find a negative and statistically significant (one-
sided p-value<0.01) association between CRIME and REM2. However, this finding
is consistent with prior evidence (Graham et al. 2005; Cohen and Zarowin 2010;
19 We run the mediator model via the medeff function in Stata. For continuous mediator and outcome
variables, the results are identical to the Baron and Kenny method (see Baron and Kenny 1986, Hicks
and Tingley 2011). We select the control variables following McGuire et al. (2012b) and include the same
control variables in the first- and second-stage regression model (see Imai et al. 2011). The results are
qualitatively similar when we (1) add all remaining demographic controls depicted in regression Eq. (1)
and (2) lag RELIGION and all demographic controls by 1 year.
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Table 7 Norms and earnings management
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
CRIME |ABEM| REM1 REM2
RELIGION − 2.10*** (0.728) 0.03 (0.046) − 0.20* (0.116) − 0.08 (0.132)
CRIME 0.01** (0.007) 0.00 (0.012) − 0.03*** (0.009)
TAX_AUTHORITY 0.02* (0.010) − 0.00 (0.001) 0.01** (0.003) 0.00 (0.004)
SIZE − 0.00 (0.029) − 0.02*** (0.005) 0.02 (0.013) 0.02 (0.016)
ROA − 0.06 (0.217) − 0.03 (0.041) 0.66** (0.261) − 0.36* (0.193)
LEV 0.08 (0.076) − 0.01 (0.014) 0.07 (0.047) 0.17*** (0.062)
BIG4 − 0.04 (0.043) − 0.01 (0.011) 0.01 (0.028) − 0.03 (0.044)
BM − 0.06 (0.042) − 0.01 (0.009) 0.07** (0.030) 0.11*** (0.038)
LOSS − 0.09 (0.091) − 0.01 (0.024) 0.01 (0.028) 0.03 (0.034)
OP_RISK 0.02 (0.029) 0.02*** (0.004) 0.00 (0.013) 0.03 (0.025)
URBANITY 0.18** (0.071) − 0.01* (0.003) − 0.01 (0.017) 0.01 (0.019)
BENCHMARK − 0.08 (0.101) − 0.02 (0.011) − 0.01 (0.013) 0.06*** (0.017)
INVEST − 0.03 (0.020) 0.01 (0.006) 0.00 (0.009) − 0.02 (0.035)
NOA 0.00 (0.089) − 0.00 (0.023) 0.21** (0.090) 0.19** (0.083)
Constant 11.74*** (3.761) 1.26* (0.724) 2.90 (1.837) − 0.08 (0.132)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1742 1742 1742 1742
F-statistic 307.73*** 29.26*** 12.60*** 26.00***
R-squared 0.63 0.01 0.22 0.17
ACME − 0.03+ − 0.01 0.06+
Direct effect 0.03 − 0.21+ − 0.09
Total effect − 0.01 − 0.22+ − 0.03
% of total effect mediated 0.40 0.04+ − 0.27
This table reports the mediation results on the effect of religiousness on earnings management through crime. All models
are estimated by OLS. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses
CRIME is the natural logarithm of the number of all crimes per 100,000 inhabitants per district; |ABEM| is the absolute
value of abnormal accruals estimated using a cross-sectional performance-adjusted Jones model (see Kothari et al. 2005);
REM1 is an aggregate measure of real earnings management calculated as the sum of abnormal discretionary expenditures
and abnormal production costs; REM2 is an aggregate measure of real earnings management calculated as the sum of
abnormal discretionary expenditures and abnormal cash flows; RELIGION is the proportion of Christian adherents per
municipality; TAX_AUTHORITY is the number of employees in the tax authority per 10,000 assigned inhabitants; SIZE
is the natural logarithm of market value of equity; ROA is the return on assets; LEV is the financial leverage defined as
total debt to total capital; BIG4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a BIG4 auditor, 0 otherwise; BM
is the book-to-market ratio; LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if income before extraordinary items was negative
in the current or previous two fiscal years, 0 otherwise; OP_RISK captures the firm operating risk, defined as the natural
logarithm of the 5-year rolling standard deviation of cash flows from operations computed from the current and prior four
fiscal years; URBANITY is the natural logarithm of the number of inhabitants per square kilometer at the district level;
BENCHMARK is an indicator variable equal to 1 if (a) net income divided by total assets is greater than or equal to 0 and
less than 0.01 or (b) the change in net income divided by total assets from year t − 1 to year t is greater than or equal to
0 and less than 0.01, 0 otherwise; INVEST captures the investment rate in tangible capital defined as the ratio of capital
expenditures in year t to net property, plant, and equipment at the end of year t − 1; NOA captures the net operating assets,
which is defined as the sum of shareholders’ equity plus total debt at the beginning of the year, scaled by total assets at the
beginning of the year. In addition, we control for the demographic characteristics population size, income, education, age,
and nationality measured at headquarters’ location in the current year. Moreover, we include an industry control variable.
For an overview on the variables see Table 11 in “Appendix”
*,**,*** One-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels for predictions, two-tailed otherwise+ Two-tailed signficant mediator effect at the 10% level
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McGuire et al. 2012b), suggesting that managers influence reported earnings either
through manipulating accruals or managing real activities, such as R&D or mainte-
nance expenses. Following Graham et al. (2005), the managers’ trade-off reflects that
(i) real earnings management reduces long-term firm value, (ii) accrual-based earn-
ings management is more likely detected, and (iii) managers perceive accrual-based
earningsmanagement as less ethically appropriate, compared to real earningsmanage-
ment, where argument (i) increases and arguments (ii) and (iii) decrease accrual-based
earnings management.
The findings in Table 7 are consistent with these arguments. In particular, we find
a positive association between crime (i.e., CRIME) and accrual-based earnings man-
agement (i.e., |ABEM|) and a negative association between crime (i.e., CRIME) and
real earnings management (i.e., REM2). The more widespread crime, the lower are
arguably the managers’ reputational cost when engaging in accrual-based earnings
management, suggesting that managers will engage more in accrual-based earnings
management and less in real earnings management.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we identify crime as a mediator of the relation
between religiousness and earnings management. In particular, we find a positive
and statistically significant (one-sided p-value<0.05) relation between CRIME and
|ABEM| and a negative and statistically significant (one-sided p-value<0.01) relation
between RELIGION and CRIME. Statistics towards the bottom of Table 7 confirm the
mediation effect of CRIME on the relation between RELIGION and |ABEM|. Simi-
larly, we find a negative and statistically significant (one-sided p-value<0.01) relation
between CRIME and REM2. The mediating effect of CRIME on the relation between
RELIGION and REM2 is again confirmed by the statistics towards the bottom of Table
7.
Overall, the findings suggest that there is an indirect relation between religious-
ness and accrual-based earnings management through local crime rates. However, the
results regarding real earnings management are inconsistent. While we find a direct
relation between religiousness and our first measure of real earnings management
(REM1), there is an indirect relation between religiousness and our second measure
of real earnings management (REM2) through local crime rates.
4.2.2 Norms and tax avoidance
To estimate the effect of religiousness and crime on firms’ tax avoidance practices,
we run the following mediation regression model, where RELIGION is defined as the
treatment variable, CRIME the mediator variable, and TA the outcome variable:
CRIME j,t = γ × REL IGI ONi,t + X l,i, j,tβ + μm + ε j,t , (4)
T Al,t = γ × REL IGI ONi,t + δ × CRIME j,t + X l,i, j,tβ + μm + εl,t , (5)
where T Al,t is a vector of the measures of tax avoidance, including PRED_UTB and
BTD per firm l and year t; X l,i, j,t is a vector of the firm-specific and demographic con-
trol variables, including the firm-specific variables ROA, LEV , NOL, PPE, INTANG,
SIZE2, andMB per firm l and year t; TAX_AUTHORITY captures the effectiveness of
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tax authorities per municipality i, and the demographic variables are AGE,MARRIED,
URBANITY , INCOME, and EDUCATION per district j and year t; μm is an industry
control variable.20 All variables are described in Sect. 3.2. We expect γ to be negative
in regressions (4) and (5), and δ to be positive in regression (5).
Table 8 presents the results on the analysis of norms and tax avoidance.We estimate
the models using 782 (1781) firm-year observations in the period of 2011–2017. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Model (1) presents the estimation
of the regression Eq. (4), while models (2) and (3) present the estimation of regression
Eq. (5). All models are estimated by OLS.
In linewithHypothesis 1b, we find a negative and statistically significant (one-sided
p-value<0.10) association between RELIGION and both measures of tax avoidance
(PRED_UTB and BTD). Different from expectations, the coefficients on CRIME are
insignificant, suggesting that crimedoes notmediate the relation between religiousness
and tax avoidance. The results in Table 8 suggest that managers consider injunctive
norms, rather than descriptive norms, when managing tax expenses.21
5 Discussion
Overall, this study provides evidence that it is important to consider both injunctive
norms (captured by religiousness) and descriptive norms (captured by crime), when
analyzing the role of norms in explaining firm behavior. For instance, the results of
the correlation analysis (Table 4) indicate a negative and statistically significant asso-
ciation between religiousness and accrual-based earnings management. But in the
multiple regression analysis, we find no relation between religiousness and accrual-
based earningsmanagement but a positive and statistically significant relation between
crime and accrual-based earnings management. Considering the negative relation
between religiousness and crime, the evidence suggests that the relation between
religiousness and accrual-based earnings management is explained by the indirect
relation through crime. Thus, if a researcher ignored the role of local crime rates when
studying the association between religiousness in firms’ geographical environment on
corporate financial reporting, that person may incorrectly infer that there is a direct
relation between religiousness and financial reporting quality.22
Moreover, while we find that managers consider religious social norms when man-
aging earnings and avoiding taxes, managers consider local crime rates only when
managing earnings. In part, this finding may be explained by the significantly smaller
sample size for the tax avoidance analysis, compared to the earnings management
analysis (782 versus 1742 observations). However, earnings management and tax
20 The results are qualitatively similar when we lag RELIGION and all demographic controls by 1 year.
21 A variance inflation factor analysis suggests that our analyses are not subject to multicollinearity.
22 Similarly, while the results of the correlation analysis (Table 4) indicate a positive and significant
association between religiousness and one measure of real earnings management (i.e., REM2), in the
multiple regression analysis, we find no relation between religiousness and real earnings management
but a negative and statistically significant relation between crime and real earnings management. Again,
this finding suggests that the relation between religiousness and real earnings management is explained by
the indirect relation through crime.
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Table 8 Norms and tax avoidance
Variables (1) (2) (3)
CRIME PRED_UTB BTD
RELIGION − 3.92*** (1.093) − 0.02* (0.014) − 0.01* (0.006)
CRIME 0.00 (0.001) − 0.00 (0.000)
TAX_AUTHORITY 0.06*** (0.017) − 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.000)
ROA − 0.13 (0.347) 0.00 (0.018) − 0.04 (0.030)
LEV 0.00 (0.190) 0.00 (0.012) − 0.00 (0.005)
NOL 0.33*** (0.120) − 0.01 (0.010) 0.01 (0.008)
PPE 0.87** (0.341) − 0.00 (0.015) − 0.00 (0.003)
INTANG 0.05 (0.240) − 0.01 (0.027) 0.01* (0.006)
SIZE2 − 0.02 (0.018) − 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001)
MB 0.06*** (0.021) 0.00** (0.001) 0.00 (0.000)
Constant 10.17 (14.828) − 0.07 (0.247) 0.39 (0.315)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry control Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 782 782 1781
F-statistic 18.02*** 1.49 1.92**
R-squared 0.59 0.04 0.01
ACME − 0.00 0.00
Direct effect − 0.02 − 0.01
Total effect − 0.02 − 0.01
% of total effect mediated 0.17 − 0.29
This table reports the mediation results of the effect of religiousness on tax avoidance through crime. All
models are estimated by OLS. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses
CRIME is the natural logarithm of the number of all crimes per 100,000 inhabitants per district;PRED_UTB
captures predicted tax benefits (see Rego andWilson 2012);BTD captures book-tax-differences (seeWilson
2009);RELIGION is the proportion of Christian adherents per municipality; TAX_AUTHORITY is the num-
ber of employees in the tax authority per 10,000 assigned inhabitants; ROA is the return on assets; LEV is
the financial leverage defined as total debt to total capital; NOL is a net operating loss indicator variable
equal to 1 if the firm did report an operating income smaller 0, 0 otherwise; PPE captures net property,
plant and equipment divided by lagged total assets; INTANG captures intangible assets divided by lagged
total assets; SIZE2 captures the market capitalization calculated as the natural logarithm of beginning of
year common shares outstanding times beginning of year stock price; MB is the market-to-book ratio. In
addition, we control for the demographic characteristics age, marital status, urbanity, income and education
measured at headquarters’ location. Moreover, we include an industry control variable. For an overview on
the variables see Table 11 in “Appendix”
*,**,*** One-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels for predictions, two-tailed otherwise
+ Two-tailed significant mediator effect at the 10% level
avoidance also arguably differ in the level of societal acceptance, which may affect
the role of norms in explaining firm behavior. While religion as an injunctive norm
discourages immorality, crime as a descriptive norm may encourage immorality as
managers, for instance, perceive the risk of being detected to be low (Kahan 1997).
To the extent that the reputational loss is higher when avoiding taxes compared to
managing earnings, when deciding about tax avoidance managers will be only sensi-
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tive to religiousness but not crime. Consistent with Cialdini et al. (1991) and Kallgren
et al. (2000), this finding suggests that injunctive norms captured by religiousness
affect firm behavior in a wider range of settings (i.e., earnings management and tax
avoidance), compared to descriptive norms (i.e., just earnings management).
6 Conclusion
The study examines the joint role of injunctive and descriptive norms for corporate
financial reporting. In particular, we study the direct association between the firm’s
exposure to religious social norms and its financial reporting quality as well as the
indirect relation through crime. We contribute to research in accounting that provides
evidence on the separate role of religiousness and crime rates in explaining corporate
financial reporting (e.g., McGuire et al. 2012b; Kedia et al. 2015; Cho et al. 2020).
We find a negative association between religiousness and individuals’ commis-
sion of crimes. This finding is consistent with the social identity theory (Tajfel 1981;
Hogg and Abrams 1988), suggesting that individuals consider norms in their decision-
making. Regarding firm behavior, we provide evidence of a negative direct relation
between religiousness and firms’ earnings management and tax avoidance, highlight-
ing the role of injunctive norms in explaining firm behavior. Moreover, we provide
partial support for the existence of a descriptive norm generated by crime in firms’
geographical environment. In particular, we find that firms located in areas with high
crime rates engage more in accrual-based earnings management. Interestingly, these
firms engage less in real earnings management, potentially benefitting long-term firm
value. Finally, jointly analyzing the role of religiousness and crime in explaining finan-
cial reporting quality, we find an exclusively indirect relation between religiousness
and firms’ engagement in accrual-based earnings management and an exclusively
direct relation between religiousness and firms’ engagement in tax avoidance. By
jointly examining the effect of injunctive and descriptive norms on firm behavior, we
answer the call by Cialdini et al. (1990), underlining the strong interrelations between
injunctive and descriptive norms.
This study is subject to some limitations. First, based on the research design, we
cannot draw causal conclusions. However, the geographical distribution of Christian-
ity in Germany has not changed significantly since 1555 (Spenkuch 2017), suggesting
that the study is less likely to be subject to reverse causality. To address the con-
cern of correlated omitted variables, we control for demographic characteristics (e.g.,
gender, age, nationality) that were found to relate to religious adherence (Iannaccone
1998). Second, due to data restrictions, we focus on Christianity. Thus we cannot
draw conclusions on the relation between the norms of other faiths, crime, and finan-
cial reporting quality. However, Christianity is the dominant religion in many other
countries besides Germany, giving our study far-reaching implications. Third, we
operationalize financial reporting quality by firms’ engagement in accrual-based and
real earnings management, relying on abnormal accruals (e.g., Kothari et al. 2005)
and abnormal expenditures measures (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008;
McGuire et al. 2012a, b). Although these measures are widely used in accounting
and auditing research, they may be subject to measurement error. For instance, the
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measures may be driven by peer effects, are often associated with implausible eco-
nomic effects, and thus should be validated ex-post (Jackson 2018). Relatedly, we
capture firms’ tax avoidance by predicted tax benefits (e.g., Rego and Wilson 2012)
and book-tax-differences (e.g., Wilson 2009). We acknowledge that there is inconsis-
tent evidence on whether book-tax-differences indicate opportunistic reporting (see
Evers et al. 2016).
Future research might explore in more detail the differences between earnings
management and tax avoidance as two types of financial reporting irregularities. We
find that firms engage less in earnings management and tax avoidance the more they
are exposed to religious social norms. However, while crime works as a mediator
for the relation between religiousness and earnings management, it does not for the
relation between religiousness and tax avoidance. Even though this findingmay be par-
tially explained by a small sample size, the finding also suggests that the interrelation
between injunctive and descriptive normsmay varywith the type of behavior. Research
along those lines can enhance understanding of the role of norms in explaining firm
behavior.
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Appendix
See Tables 9, 10 and 11.
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11.22 4.42 1.38 2.9
Hamburg 0.01 0.21 8.96 3.6
Lower
Saxony
7.10 13.34 3.90 8.8




4.53 9.54 21.41 20.9




13.28 5.55 2.58 4.4
Baden-
Württemberg
13.29 10.00 15.90 15.1
Bavaria 24.79 19.73 21.41 18.5
Saarland 0.16 0.72 0.00 1.1
Berlin 0.01 0.25 8.67 4.3





0.01 6.51 0.00 1.3
Saxony 5.09 5.16 0.92 3.7
Saxony-
Anhalt
2.58 5.72 0.00 1.9
Thuringia 8.61 4.53 0.40 1.9
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
This table reports the geographical distribution of the observations
from the sample on the analysis of religiousness and crime (norms and
earningsmanagement). The statistics are based on the full sample from
2014 to 2017 (2011–2017) with 32,973 (1742) observations
The benchmark to evaluate the geographical representativeness of the
sample on the analysis of norms and individual behavior and norms and
earnings management is the German states’ area in square kilometers
and the GDP per German state, respectively. Both variables are drawn
from the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the
Federal States
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Table 10 Industry
Industry (NACE) Frequency Percent
Administrative and Support Service Activities (digits 77–82) 22 1.26
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation (digits 90–93) 35 2.01
Construction (digits 41–43) 3 0.17
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply (digit 35) 71 4.08
Financial and Insurance Activities (digits 64–66) 129 7.41
Human Health and Social Work Activities (digits 86–88) 8 0.46
Information and Communication (digits 58–63) 339 19.46
Manufacturing (digits 10–33) 736 42.25
Other Service Activities (digits 94–96) 43 2.47
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities (digits 69–75) 33 1.89
Real Estate Activities (digit 68) 120 6.89
Transportation and Storage (digits 49–53) 52 2.99




This table reports the distribution of firms regarding industry and is based on the sample on the analysis of
norms and earnings management. The statistics are based on the full sample from 2011 to 2017 with 1742
observations
Table 11 Variable definitions
Variable name Variable definitions
Norms
RELIGION Proportion of Christian adherents per municipality
CRIME Natural logarithm of the number of all crimes per 100,000 inhabitants per district
Individual and corporate enforcement
SANCTION_SEVERITY Relative sanction severity in the number of years with freedom sanction per state
CLEARANCE_RATE Proportion of cleared crimes per district
TAX AUTHORITY Number of employees in the tax authority per 10,000 assigned inhabitants
Earnings management
|ABEM| Absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated using a cross-sectional
performance-adjusted Jones model (see Kothari et al. 2005)
REM1 Aggregate measure of real earnings management calculated as the sum of
abnormal discretionary expenditures (AB_DISC) and abnormal production
costs (AB_PROD) where AB_DISC is the residual of the following regression:
DI SC_EX Pi,t
Assetsi,t−1 = β0 1Assetsi,t−1 + β1
Salesi,t−1
Assetsi,t−1 + εi,t
where DISC_EXP is the sum of R&D expenses and SG&A expenses (which
include advertising expenses in Datastream), sales are defined as annual
revenues, and assets as total assets. Following McGuire et al. (2012a, b), we set
R&D expenses equal to 0 if they are missing, but SG&A costs are available.
Furthermore, following McGuire et al. (2012a, b), we multiply AB_DISC by −
1 such that higher values of AB_DISC indicate an increase in real earnings
management
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Table 11 continued
Variable name Variable definitions
AB_PROD is the residual of the following regression:
PRODi,t







where PROD is the sum of costs of goods sold and change in inventory from one
year to the next. We also standardize AB_PROD by multiplying it with − 1
REM2 Aggregate measure of real earnings management calculated as the sum of
abnormal discretionary expenditures (AB_DISC) and abnormal cash flows
(AB_CASH) where AB_CASH is the residual of the following regression:
CFOi,t





where CFO is defined as cash flows from operations. We also standardize
AB_CASH by multiplying it with − 1
SIZE Natural logarithm of market value of equity
ROA Return on assets
LEV Financial leverage defined as total debt to total capital
BIG4 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a BIG4 auditor, 0 otherwise
BM Book-to-market ratio
LOSS Indicator variable equal to 1 if income before extraordinary items was negative
in the current or previous two fiscal years, 0 otherwise
OP_RISK Firm operating risk, defined as the natural logarithm of the five-year rolling
standard deviation of cash flows from operations computed from the current
and prior four fiscal years
URBANITY Natural logarithm of the number of inhabitants per square kilometer at the
district level
BENCHMARK Indicator variable equal to 1 if (a) net income divided by total assets is greater
than or equal to 0 and less than 0.01 or (b) the change in net income divided by
total assets from year t − 1 to year t is greater than or equal to 0 and less than
0.01, 0 otherwise
INVEST Investment rate in tangible capital defined as the ratio of capital expenditures in
year t to net property, plant, and equipment at the end of year t − 1
NOA Net operating assets, which is defined as the sum of shareholders’ equity plus
total debt at the beginning of the year, scaled by total assets at the beginning of
the year
Tax avoidance
PRED_UTB Predicted tax benefits, which are defined as follows (see Rego and Wilson 2012):
PRED_UT B = −0.004 + 0.011 ∗ ROA + 0.001 ∗ SI Z E + 0.010 ∗ FOR_SALE
+ 0.092 ∗ RD − 0.002 ∗ DI SC_ACCR + 0.003 ∗ LEV + 0.000
∗ MB + 0.014 ∗ SGA − 0.018 ∗ SALES_GR
where, ROA = return on assets divided by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural
logarithm of total assets; FOR_SALE = indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm
reports foreign sales, 0 otherwise; RD = research and development expenses
divided by lagged total assets; DISC_ACCR = absolute value of abnormal
accruals estimated using a cross-sectional performance-adjusted Jones model
(see Kothari et al. 2005); LEV = financial leverage divided by lagged total
assets; MB = market-to-book ratio; SGA = selling, general, and administrative
expenses divided by lagged total assets; and SALES_GR = sales growth
Note that higher predicted tax benefits signal higher tax avoidance
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Table 11 continued
Variable name Variable definitions












note that higher book-tax-differences signal higher tax avoidance
ROA See definition above
LEV See definition above
NOL Net operating loss indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm did report an operating
income smaller 0, 0 otherwise
PPE Net property, plant and equipment divided by lagged total assets
INTANG Intangible assets divided by lagged total assets
SIZE2 Market capitalization calculated as the natural logarithm of beginning of year
common shares outstanding times beginning of year stock price
MB Market-to-book ratio
Demographic characteristics
AGE Natural logarithm of the average age of inhabitants per district
GENDER Proportion of female inhabitants per district
NATIONALITY Proportion of inhabitants with foreign (non-German) nationality per district
EDUCATION Proportion of inhabitants having a general or subject-linked higher education
entrance qualification per district
INCOME Natural logarithm of the available income per inhabitant per district;
UNEMPLOYED Share of unemployed inhabitants on total population per municipality
MARRIED Proportion of married inhabitants per district; and
URBANITY See definition above
This table lists the variables used in the empirical analysis and their description. All continuous firm characteristic
variables are winsorized at 99% in the analyses. The demographic control variables and the variables RELIGION
and CLEARANCE_RATE are lagged by 1 year in the analysis on norms and behavior
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